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In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument (DA, for short) based on a third type of 
solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt-
Sowers-Sober analysis. The present line of thought is based on the fact that both aforementioned 
analyses are based on an inaccurate analogy. After discussing the imperfections of both models, I 
present then a novel model that fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. 
This last model also encapsulates both Carter-Leslie’s and Eckhardt et al.’s models, and reveals a link 
with the issue of mind-body dualism. Lastly I argue that this novel analogy, combined with an 
adequate solution to the reference class problem, leads to a novel formulation of the argument that 
could well be more consensual than the original one1. 
 
 
7KH&DUWHU/HVOLH9LHZ
 
Let us begin by sketching briefly the Doomsday argument. The argument can be described as a 
reasoning leading to a bayesian shift, from an analogy between what has been termed the WZR XUQ
FDVH2 and the corresponding human situation. Consider, first, the WZR XUQ FDVH. According to Nick 
Bostrom’s (1997) presentation, it runs as follows: 
 
Imagine that two big urns are put in front of you, and you know that one of them contains ten 
balls and the other a million, but you are ignorant as to which is which. You know the balls in 
each urn are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 ... etc. Now you take a ball at random from the left urn, and it is 
number 7. Clearly, this is a strong indication that that urn contains only ten balls. If originally 
the odds were fifty-fifty, a swift application of Bayes’ theorem gives you the posterior 
probability that the left urn is the one with only ten balls. (Pposterior (L=10) = 0.999990). 
 
The WZRXUQFDVH constitutes an uncontroversial application of Bayes’ theorem. It is based on the two 
following competing hypotheses: 
 
 (H1few) the urn contains 10 balls 
 (H2many) the urn contains 1000000 balls 
 
and the corresponding prior probabilities: P(H1) = P(H2) = 0.5. Taking into account the fact that E 
denotes the available evidence that the random ball is #7 and P(E|H1) = 1/10 and P(E|H2) = 
1/1000000, a bayesian shift ensues from a straightforward application of Bayes’ theorem. As a result, 
the posterior probability is such that P’(H1) = 0.99999. 
Let us consider, on the other hand, the human situation corresponding to DA3: 
 
(...) now consider the case where instead of the urns you have two possible human races, and 
instead of balls you have individuals, ranked according to birth order. As a matter of fact, you 
happen to find that your rank is about sixty billion. Now, say Carter and Leslie, we should 
reason in the same way as we did with the urns. That you should have a rank of sixty billion or 
so is much more likely if only 100 billion persons will ever have lived than if there will be many 
trillion persons. Therefore, by Bayes’ theorem, you should update your beliefs about mankind’s 
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prospects and realise that an impending doomsday is much more probable than you have 
hitherto thought. 
 
It is apparent that the corresponding human situation leads to the two following hypotheses:  
 
 (H3few) the number of humans having ever lived will reach 1011 (GRRPVRRQ) 
 (H4many) the number of humans having ever lived will reach 1014 (GRRPODWHU) 
 
Call this situation the (KXPDQ)VLWXDWLRQFRUUHVSRQGLQJWR'$. In this case, the prior probabilities are 
such that P(H1) = P(H2) = 0.5 and E denotes the fact that your birth rank is 60x109. An application of 
Bayes’ theorem, taking into account the fact that P(E|H1) = 1/1011 and P(E|H1) = 1/1014, leads to a 
vigorous bayesian shift: P’(H1) = 0.999. 
According to Carter and Leslie4, the KXPDQVLWXDWLRQFRUUHVSRQGLQJWR'$ is analogous to the WZR
XUQFDVH. And this leads to a vigorous bayesian shift in favor of the hypothesis that Doom will occur 
soon. For this reason, the Carter-Leslie line of thought can be summarized as follows: 
 
 (5) in the WZRXUQFDVH, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew ensues 
 (6) the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the WZRXUQFDVH 
 (7) ∴
 in the situation corresponding to DA, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew 
ensues 
 
From the Carter-Leslie’s viewpoint, the analogy with the urn is well-grounded. And this legitimates 
DA’s conclusion according to which a bayesian shift in favor of doom soon ensues. 
 
 
7KH(FNKDUGW6RZHUV6REHU$QDO\VLV
 
A line of objection to the Doomsday Argument initially raised by William Eckhardt (1993, 1997) and 
recently echoed by George Sowers (2002) and Elliott Sober (2003) runs as follows. The analogy with 
the urn at the origin of DA, so the objection goes, is ill-grounded. For in the WZRXUQFDVH, the ball 
number is randomly chosen. But in the human situation corresponding to DA, our birth rank is not 
randomly chosen, but rather indexed on the corresponding temporal position. Hence, the analogy is ill-
grounded and the whole reasoning is invalid. Eckhardt notably stresses on the fact that it is impossible 
to make a random selection when there exists numerous unborn members in the chosen reference 
class5. Sober (2003) argues along the same lines6, by pointing out that no mechanism having the effect 
of randomly assigning a temporal location to human beings, can be exhibited. Lastly, such a line of 
objection has been recently revived by Sowers. He emphasizes that the birth rank of each human is not 
random, because it is indexed on the corresponding temporal position7. 
In parallel, according to the Eckhardt et al. analysis, the human situation corresponding to DA is not 
analogous to the WZR XUQ FDVH, but rather to the FRQVHFXWLYH WRNHQ GLVSHQVHU initially described by 
Eckhardt8: 
 
(...) suppose on each trial the FRQVHFXWLYHWRNHQGLVSHQVHU expels either 50 (early doom) or 100 
(late doom) consecutively numbered tokens at the rate of one per minute. 
 
A similar device is also mentioned by Sowers9: 
 
There are two urns populated with balls as before, but now the balls are not numbered. Suppose 
you obtain your sample with the following procedure. You are equipped with a stopwatch and a 
marker. You first choose one of the urns as your subject. It doesn’t matter which urn is chosen. 
You start the stopwatch. Each minute you reach into the urn and withdraw a ball. The first ball 
withdrawn you mark with the number one and set aside. The second ball you mark with the 
number two. In general, the Qth ball withdrawn you mark with the number Q. After an arbitrary 
amount of time has elapsed, you stop the watch and the experiment. In parallel with the original 
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scenario, suppose the last ball withdrawn is marked with a seven. Will there be a probability 
shift? An examination of the relative likelihoods reveals no. 
 
Thus, according to the Eckhardt et al. line of thought, the human situation corresponding to DA is 
not analogous to the WZR XUQ FDVH, but rather to the FRQVHFXWLYH WRNHQ GLVSHQVHU. And in this last 
model, the conditional probabilities are such that P(E|H1) = P(E|H2) = 1. As a consequence, the prior 
probabilities of the two alternative hypotheses Hfew and Hmany are unchanged. Hence, the 
corresponding line of reasoning goes as follows: 
 
 (8) in the FRQVHFXWLYHWRNHQGLVSHQVHU, the prior probabilities remain unchanged 
 (9) the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the FRQVHFXWLYHWRNHQGLVSHQVHU 
 (10) ∴
 in the situation corresponding to DA, the prior probabilities remain unchanged 
 
thus yielding P(Hfew) = P’(Hfew) and P(Hmany) = P’(Hmany). 
 
 
7KH$QDORJ\ZLWKWKH8UQ
 
As we have seen, according to the Carter-Leslie view, DA is based on an analogy between the human 
situation corresponding to DA and the WZRXUQFDVH. By contrast, from the Eckhardt et al. standpoint, 
the analogy associates the human situation corresponding to DA and the FRQVHFXWLYHWRNHQGLVSHQVHU. 
In what follows, I shall argue that both analogies suffer from some defects and consequently do not 
prove fully adequate. This leads finally to reformulating the analogy more accurately. 
Let us begin with the analogy with the FRQVHFXWLYH WRNHQGLVSHQVHU, which is characteristic of the 
Eckhardt et al. line of thought. Eckhardt describes the FRQVHFXWLYHWRNHQGLVSHQVHU, where the tokens 
are expelled from the urn at FRQVWDQW intervals of time (’one per minute’). Sowers describes an 
analogous experiment, which can be termed the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU, where the balls are expelled 
from the urn and numbered accordingly, at the FRQVWDQW rate of one per minute. In this last experiment, 
the balls are numbered in the order of their expulsion from the urn. Nevertheless, both Eckhardt’s and 
Sowers’ experiments do not exactly correspond to the human situation corresponding to DA. For in 
this last situation, the humans appear on Earth at YDULDEOH intervals of time. At this step, it is apparent 
that this second analogy also stands in need of refinement, in order to fit more adequately with the 
intrinsic features of the human situation corresponding to DA. 
However, this can be regarded as a minor qualm. For both Eckhardt’s and Sowers’ experiments can 
be restated with items that are expelled at LUUHJXODU rates instead of FRQVWDQW ones. Consider, for 
example, Sowers’ QXPEHUHG EDOO GLVSHQVHU. One could consider alternatively a variation of the 
QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU where the tokens are expelled from the urn at LUUHJXODU intervals of time and 
where the balls’ numbers correspond to the rank of their expulsion from the urn. For the sake of 
argument, call such a variation the LUUHJXODU QXPEHUHG EDOO GLVSHQVHU. It appears then that the 
LUUHJXODU QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU is not vulnerable to the above mentioned objection. 
 
Consider, second, the analogy with the WZRXUQFDVH inherent to the Carter-Leslie view. Let us begin 
with the characteristics of the human situation corresponding to DA. A summary analysis shows 
indeed that this last situation is WHPSRUDO. In effect, the birth ranks are successively attributed to human 
beings in function of the temporal position corresponding to their appearance on Earth. Thus, the 
corresponding situation takes place, say, from T1 to Tn, 1 and Q being respectively the rank number of 
the first and of the last human. By contrast, the WZRXUQFDVH is DWHPSRUDO, for at the moment where the 
ball is randomly drawn, all balls are already present in the urn10. Consequently, the WZRXUQFDVH takes 
place at a given time T0. Thus, the situation corresponding to DA needs to be modeled in a temporal 
model, while the WZRXUQFDVH is rendered in an atemporal model. In short, the situation corresponding 
to DA being WHPSRUDO, and the WZRXUQ FDVH being DWHPSRUDO precludes us from regarding the two 
situations as isomorphic11. At this step, it is apparent that the human situation corresponding to DA 
being temporal should be put in analogy more accurately with a WHPSRUDO experiment. 
Let us investigate now how the preceding inconvenient could be overcome. Consider then the 
following experiment: 
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7KH V\QFKURQLFDQGGHWHUPLQLVWLF LQFUHPHQWDO WZRXUQFDVHAn urn12 is in front of you, and 
you know that it contains either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. At time T0, you blindly draw a ball 
#H from the urn. Then a device expels at T1 the ball #1, at T2 the ball #2..., at Tn the ball #Q (the 
intervals of time, i. e. from T1 to Tn, are LUUHJXODU) Now, according to the result of the 
experiment realized in T0, the device stops at Te when the ball #H is expelled. At this step, you 
formulate the Hfew and Hmany assumptions with P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5 and you try to evaluate 
the number of balls which were contained at T0 in the urn. You conclude then to an upwards 
bayesian shift in favour of the Hfew hypothesis. 
 
At this step, it should be emphasized that anyone who accepts the conclusion of the WZR XUQ FDVH 
would also accept the bayesian shift resulting from the LQFUHPHQWDO WZRXUQFDVH. It should be also 
pointed out that this last experiment does not face the above mentioned criticisms concerning the 
analogy between the human situation corresponding to DA and the WZR XUQ FDVH. For it has been 
shown that the human situation corresponding to DA, being temporal, cannot be put in analogy with 
the WZR XUQ FDVH, which is atemporal. By contrast, the LQFUHPHQWDO WZR XUQ FDVH is a temporal 
experiment. Thus, the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH meets the above mentioned requirements concerning 
the analogy and can be legitimately put in analogy with the human situation corresponding to DA. In 
this context, we now face a variation of DA which can be summarized as follows: 
 
 (11) in the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew ensues 
 (12) the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH 
 (13) ∴ in the situation corresponding to DA, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew 
ensues 
 
And this last variation is not vulnerable to the above objection. The analogy with the urn is now 
plainly plausible, since both situations are WHPSRUDO. 
At this point, it is also worth scrutinizing the consequences of the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH on the 
Eckhardt et al. analysis. For in the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH, the number of each ball expelled from 
the device is indexed on the rank of its expulsion. For example, you draw the ball #60000000000. But 
you also know that the preceding ball was #59999999999 and that the penultimate ball was 
#59999999998, etc. However, this does not prevent you from reasoning in the same way as in the 
classical WZRXUQFDVH and from concluding to a bayesian shift in favor of the Hfew hypothesis. In this 
context, the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH has the following consequence: WKHIDFWRIEHLQJWLPHLQGH[HG
GRHVQRWHQWDLOWKDWWKHEDOOQXPEHULVQRWUDQGRPO\FKRVHQ. Contrast now with the central claim of the 
Eckhardt et al. analysis that the birth rank of each human is not randomly chosen, but rather indexed 
on the corresponding temporal position. Sowers in particular considers that the cause of DA is the 
time-indexation of the number corresponding to the birth rank13. But what the LQFUHPHQWDO WZRXUQ
FDVH and the corresponding analogy demonstrates, is that our birth rank can be time-indexed and 
nevertheless considered as random for DA purposes. And this point can be regarded as a significant 
objection to Sowers’ analysis. This last remark leads to consider that the concrete analysis presented by 
Sowers does not prove however sufficient to solve DA. For the problem is revived when one considers 
the analogy between on the one hand, the human situation corresponding to DA and on the other hand, 
the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH. One can think that it is this last analogy which constitutes truly the core 
of the DA-like reasoning. In this context, Sowers’ conclusion according to which his analysis leads to 
the demise of DA appears far too strong. Echoing Eckhardt, he has certainly provided additional steps 
leading towards the resolution of DA and clarified significant points, but Sowers’ analysis does not 
address veritably the strongest formulations of DA. 
At this step, it appears that other variations of the incremental two urn case can even be envisaged. 
For consider the following variant: 
 
7KHGLDFKURQLFDQGGHWHUPLQLVWLF LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVHAn opaque device contains an urn 
that has either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. At time T1, a robot inside the device draws a ball in 
the urn (containing the balls #1 to #Q) and the device expels the ball #1; if the ball #1 has been 
drawn then the device stops at T1; else at T2, the robot draws a ball in the urn (now containing 
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the balls #2 to #Q) and the device expels the ball #2; if the ball #2 has been drawn then the 
device stops at T2; ...; else at Ti, the robot draws a ball in the urn (now containing the balls #L to 
#Q) and the device expels the ball #L; if the ball #L has been drawn then the device stops at Ti; 
else at Ti+1, etc. (the intervals of time, i. e. from T1 to Tn, are LUUHJXODU). You know all the above 
and you get the ball #H at Te when the device stops14. You formulate the Hfew and Hmany 
assumptions with P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5 and you conclude to an upwards bayesian shift in 
favour of the Hfew hypothesis. 
 
In this case, the random selection is performed gradually and only made effective at time Te. This 
contrasts with the synchronic version of the experiment, where the random selection is made 
definitively at time T0. 
Furthermore, the following variation takes into account an indeterministic situation: 
 
7KH GLDFKURQLFDQG LQGHWHUPLQLVWLF LQFUHPHQWDO WZRXUQFDVHAn opaque device contains an 
urn that has 10 balls at T1, but will ultimately have either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. The final 
number of balls in the urn will remain undetermined until an internal mechanism will flip a fair 
coin at a given time Ti (1 ≤ L < 10). If heads, it will add 990 numbered balls (#11 to #1000) in 
the urn at Ti. If tails, it will do nothing. At time T1, a random generator inside the device issues a 
number in the range [1, 1000] and the device expels the ball #1; if the number 1 has been issued 
then the device stops at T1; else at T2, the random generator issues a number in the range [2, 
1000] and the device expels the ball #2; if the number 2 has been issued then the device stops at 
T2; ...; else at Ti-1, the random generator issues a number in the range [L-1, 1000] and the device 
expels the ball #L-1; if the number L-1 has been issued then the device stops at Ti-1; else at Ti (1 ≤ 
L < 10), the random generator issues a number in the range [L, Q] (the total number of balls in the 
urn after the flipping of the coin is Q) and the device expels the ball #L; if the number L has been 
issued then the device stops at Ti; else at Ti+1, etc. (the intervals of time, i. e. from T1 to Tn, are 
LUUHJXODU). Now you know all the above and you get the ball #H at Te when the device stops. 
You formulate the Hfew and Hmany assumptions relating to the total number of balls in the urn 
after the flipping of the coin with P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5 and you conclude to an upwards 
bayesian shift in favour of the Hfew hypothesis15. 
 
The novelty in this variation is that it takes into account an indeterministic situation, namely where the 
number of balls present in the urn is unknown at the time where the first ball is expelled from the 
device. Such a variation shows that a random selection can even be made when the number of balls in 
the urn is unknown at the time where the random process begins. And this appears (at least partly) as a 
counter-example to Eckhardt’s attack against the random sampling assumption in DA. As mentioned 
above, Eckhardt considers in effect that it is impossible to make a random selection when there exists 
many unborn members in the given reference class. But the GLDFKURQLF DQG LQGHWHUPLQLVWLF 
LQFUHPHQWDO WZR XUQ FDVH suggests that a random selection can even be made, under certain 
indeterministic circumstances. 
However, it should be acknowledged that this only weakens Eckhardt’s point, since the above 
experiment does not handle every type of indeterministic situation. In effect, Eckhardt could reply 
with an experiment of the following type: 
 
7KHGLDFKURQLFDQGLQGHWHUPLQLVWLF FRQVHFXWLYHWRNHQGLVSHQVHUAn opaque device contains an 
urn that has 10 balls at T1, but will ultimately have either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. The final 
number of balls in the urn will remain undetermined until an internal mechanism will flip a fair 
coin at a given time Ti (1 ≤ L < 10). If heads, it will add 990 numbered balls (#11 to #1000) in 
the urn at Ti. If tails, it will do nothing. At time T1, a random generator inside the device issues a 
number in the range [1, 10] and the device expels the ball #1; if the number 1 has been issued 
then the device stops at T1; else at T2, the random generator issues a number in the range [2, 10] 
and the device expels the ball #2; if the number 2 has been issued then the device stops at T2; ...; 
else at Ti-1, the random generator issues a number in the range [L-1, 10] and the device expels the 
ball #L-1; if the number L-1 has been issued then the device stops at Ti-1; else at Ti, the random 
generator issues a number in the range [L, Q] (the total number of balls in the urn after the 
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flipping of the coin is Q) and the device expels the ball #L; if the number L has been issued then 
the device stops at Ti; else at Ti+1, etc. (the intervals of time, i. e. from T1 to Tn, are LUUHJXODU). 
Now you know all the above and you get the ball #5 at T5 when the device stops. You formulate 
the Hfew and Hmany assumptions relating to the total number of balls in the urn after the flipping 
of the coin, with P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5 and you conclude that the prior probabilities remain 
unchanged16. 
 
In such a case, the drawing of the ball #5 at random gives us no grounds for concluding to a bayesian 
shift in favor of the Hfew assumption. 
 
 
$7KLUG5RXWH
 
Given the above developments, we are now in a position to scrutinize the version of DA based on a 
analogy between the human situation corresponding to DA and the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH. As we 
have seen, this last version constitutes a strong variation of the argument in the sense that it is not 
open, first, to the charge of putting in correspondence an atemporal model with a temporal situation. 
This last variation is not vulnerable, second, to the objection that results from the Eckhardt et al. 
analysis, according to which our birth rank is not random because it is time-indexed. Let us question 
now whether the human situation corresponding to DA is analogous or not to the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQ
FDVH. According to this novel formulation of DA, the question that arises is the following: are the 
situation corresponding to DA and the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQ FDVH fully isomorphic? 
Let us begin with the V\QFKURQLF DQG GHWHUPLQLVWLF LQFUHPHQWDO WZR XUQ FDVH. At this step, it 
appears that the part of the experiment that takes place from to T1 to Tn proves fully analogous with 
the human situation corresponding to DA. Both situations are temporal and relate to numerous objects 
(or individuals), the number of which is that of their expulsion (or birth) rank. In this sense, the 
analogy proves strongly established. Nevertheless, it should be observed that some trouble emerges 
when one considers the situation that takes place at T0. For in the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH, a random 
selection of a numbered ball is made at that very moment. Such a random selection takes place with 
absolute certainty at T0. But does an analogous random selection take place with the same degree of 
certainty at the eve of the beginning of humankind? The answer is no. For we lack any proof that the 
birth rank of future humans is determined by a random selection having occurred just before the 
beginning of humankind. In other words, has God gathered all the souls of the future humans before 
the existence of humankind and determined the birth rank of each future human by a random 
selection? Do we have any evidence that such random selection has occurred just before the birth of 
the first human? No. We currently lack evidence of any such random process. In the case of the human 
situation corresponding to DA, the occurrence of any such random selection remains fully 
K\SRWKHWLFDO. Hence, it can be concluded that there exists an important disanalogy between the human 
situation corresponding to DA and the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH. This disanalogy concerns on the one 
hand, the situation that has occurred just before the appearance of humankind and on the other hand, 
the experiment that takes place at T0 in the LQFUHPHQWDO WZR XUQ FDVH. While the occurrence of a 
random selection is known with absolute certainty in this last situation, the occurrence of an analogous 
random selection just before the appearance of humankind remains highly hypothetical. 
The same goes for the GLDFKURQLFDQGGHWHUPLQLVWLF LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH. In effect, just as in 
the preceding case, the part of the experiment that takes place from to T1 to Tn is fully analogous with 
the human situation corresponding to DA. But the disanalogy emerges with the consideration of a 
diachronic random process occurring from to T1 to Te. Does God diachronically proceed to the random 
selection of the birth rank among the remaining souls of the future humans? Just as in the previous 
case, we lack here evidence of any such diachronic random selection. 
 
At this step, it is also worth evaluating alternatively the analogy between the human situation 
corresponding to DA and the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU. Just as with the LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH, it 
appears that the part of the experiment that takes place from to T1 to Tn is fully analogous with the 
human situation corresponding to DA. This should not be surprising because the H[WHUQDO parts of both 
the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU and LQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH are identical. For an observer, there is no 
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external difference between the two experiments. But it also appears that there exists a striking 
difference between the human situation corresponding to DA and the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU. This 
difference concerns the event occurring at T0. For in the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU, no event occurs at 
T0. And such a property of the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU is known with absolute certainty. By contrast, 
what has occurred at the period preceding the existence of humankind remains indeterminate. Given 
its intrinsic nature, this period is full of uncertainty. Whether or not God has gathered the souls of all 
future humans before the appearance of humankind and fixed accordingly the birth rank of each future 
human by a random selection, remains a mere conjecture. Similarly, in the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU, 
no random process is diachronically performed. Call α an event of this type, where a random selection 
- whether synchronically at T0 or diachronically from to T1 to Te - is made. It should be pointed out 
that such an event seems prima facie highly unlikely. But are we allowed to rule out the possibility of 
any such event on rational grounds? No. For we lack evidence of the contrary. On the basis of the 
evidence at our disposal, we cannot consider with absolute certainty that such a random selection has 
not occurred, nor that it has occurred. Hence, the probability of any such event just before the birth of 
humankind is indeterminate, i. e. formally, 0 < P(α) < 1. 
What precedes casts light on the crucial point that the experiment analogous to the human situation 
corresponding to DA should reflect this last property, namely that 0 < P(α) < 1. The model on which 
the human situation corresponding to DA is based should allow for the K\SRWKHWLFDO occurrence of an 
event - whether synchronic or diachronic - leading to a random selection. For neither the LQFUHPHQWDO
WZRXUQFDVH nor the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU allow for this last possibility. In effect, the LQFUHPHQWDO
WZRXUQFDVH is based on P(α) = 1, and the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU relies on P(α) = 0. Both models do 
not reflect the crucial point that in the human situation corresponding to DA, the occurrence of an α-
type event is purely K\SRWKHWLFDO, i. e. such that 0 < P(α) < 1. 
At this point, we are in a position to describe a model for the human situation corresponding to DA 
which is not open to the charge of not reflecting the hypothetical occurrence of an α-type event: 
 
7KHK\SRWKHWLFDO LQFUHPHQWDO WZRXUQFDVH With a probability P(α) such that 0 < P(α) < 1, a 
device performs either a QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU or a - synchronic or diachronic - LQFUHPHQWDO
WZRXUQFDVH experiment. Now you get the ball #H at Te when the device stops. Given the Hfew 
and Hmany assumptions and P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5, how would you update your prior 
probabilities? 
 
Now, whatever the chosen random number, the device has expelled the ball #1 at time T1, the ball #2 
at time T2, ..., the ball #H at time Te. This last experiment presents the following property: there is no 
H[WHUQDO difference whether the performed experiment is a QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU or an LQFUHPHQWDO
WZRXUQFDVH. Let us analyze then the K\SRWKHWLFDOLQFUHPHQWDOWZRXUQFDVH in more detail. On the one 
hand, the situation that takes place from T1 to Tn does reflect the part of the human situation 
corresponding to DA that takes place from the beginning of humankind17 to our current birth. On the 
other hand, the characteristics of the situation that takes place at T0 (synchronically) or from to T1 to Te 
(diachronically) now correspond adequately to our current situation. In the lack of evidence that P(α) 
= 0 or conversely that P(α) = 1, we currently face a probability such that 0 < P(α) < 1. Finally, this 
leads to the following line of reasoning: 
 
 (14) in the K\SRWKHWLFDO LQFUHPHQWDO WZRXUQFDVH, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of 
Hfew possibly ensues 
 (15) the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the K\SRWKHWLFDO LQFUHPHQWDO WZR XUQ
FDVH 
 (16) ∴ in the situation corresponding to DA, a bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew 
possibly ensues 
 
in replacement of the steps (5)-(7) of the Carter-Leslie line of reasoning and of the steps (8)-(10) of the 
Eckhardt et al. line of argument. 
At this step, it is tempting to try to evaluate the probability P(α). Must one retain a very small 
probability for α, by considering that the probability of an α-type event could have occurred before or 
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during the appearance of humankind is very low? Or shouldn’t an alternative line of reasoning be 
adopted? For the consideration that we are random human souls renders plausible an α-type event. 
Here, given the lack of current evidence, we cannot decide objectively in favor of one of the two 
possibilities. What remains in force is an indeterminate situation, i. e. such that 0 < P(α) < 1. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that this situation presents a link with the issue of PLQGERG\ GXDOLVP. 
It should be noticed that the preferential choice of the QXPEHUHGEDOOGLVSHQVHU or of the LQFUHPHQWDO
WZRXUQFDVH parallels the responses to the problem of mind-body dualism. In effect, the QXPEHUHGEDOO
GLVSHQVHU seems best suited for those who adopt a materialist view on this issue. By contrast, the 
LQFUHPHQWDO WZR XUQ FDVH appears more adequate for those who prefer a dualist approach. For the 
scenario of God drawing at random (whether synchronically or diachronically) the souls of all 
humans, would seem more plausible to those who believe in the mind-body duality.  
 
 
7KH5HIHUHQFH&ODVV3UREOHP
 
At this point, it is worth recalling the UHIHUHQFHFODVVSUREOHP18. Roughly, it is the problem of how to 
define ’humans’. More accurately, it can be stated as follows: how can the reference class be 
objectively defined for DA-purposes? For an extensive or restrictive definition of the reference class 
can be given. An extensively defined reference class would include for example the somewhat exotic 
future evolutions of humankind, for example with an average I.Q. of 200 or with backward causation 
abilities. Conversely, a restrictively designed reference class would only include those humans who 
correspond accurately to the characteristics of, say, KRPR VDSLHQV VDSLHQV, thus excluding the past 
KRPRVDSLHQVQHDQGHUWDOHQVLV and the future KRPRVDSLHQVVXSHUVDSLHQV. To put it more in adequation 
with our current taxonomy, the reference class can be defined at different levels which correspond 
respectively to the supergenus VXSHUKRPR, the KRPR genus, the KRPR VDSLHQV species, the KRPR
VDSLHQV VDSLHQV subspecies, etc. At this step, we lack an objective criterion to choose the 
corresponding level non-arbitrarily. 
Leslie’s treatment of the reference class problem is exposed in the response made to Eckhardt (1993) 
and in Leslie (1996)19. Leslie’s response to the reference class problem is as follows. According to 
Leslie, one can choose the reference class more or less as one wishes, i. e. at a somewhat arbitrary 
level. Once this choice is performed, it suffices to adjust the prior probabilities accordingly to get the 
argument moving. Thus, on Leslie’s view, the reference class problem can be overcome because the 
argument works for DOO reference classes. For that reason, Leslie’s viewpoint can be termed an 
XQGLIIHUHQWLDWHG account of the reference class problem. Leslie’s sole condition is that the reference 
class should not be chosen at an extreme level of extension or of restriction20. In sum, Leslie considers 
that a bayesian shift ensues for whatever reference class arbitrarily chosen, at a somewhat reasonable 
level of extension or of restriction. 
I have expressed my own view on the UHIHUHQFH FODVV SUREOHP in Franceschi (1998, 1999). By 
contrast to Leslie’s viewpoint, its can be characterized as a GLIIHUHQWLDO account of the reference class 
problem. The rationale goes as follows. For the sake of argument, let us assimilate the reference class, 
somewhat arbitrarily, to the KRPRVDSLHQVVDSLHQV subspecies. DA entails then a bayesian shift in favor 
of the Hfew hypothesis for this last subspecies. Nevertheless, this does not preclude us from choosing, 
at an identically arbitrary level, a reference class slightly more extensive, say the KRPR VDSLHQV 
species, that will survive. For the extinction of the KRPR VDSLHQV VDSLHQV subspecies could well be 
followed by the survival of the KRPRVDSLHQVVXSHUVDSLHQV subspecies. More generally, for whatever 
chosen reference class, I can still choose a slightly more extensive class that will survive. And it 
should be pointed out that it has the effect of depriving the original argument from its initial terror. At 
this step, it should be apparent that the consideration of a GLIIHUHQWLDO WUHDWPHQWRIWKH UHIHUHQFHFODVV
SUREOHP renders the argument innocuous. Finally, this gives a way of accepting its conclusion by 
rendering the argument less counterintuitive than in its original formulation. 
At this point, it should be pointed out that an empirical test of a GLIIHUHQWLDO account of the reference 
class problem can even be made21. In effect, a confirmatory instance of this last account can be 
exhibited. For consider, first, the case of a neandertalian22 who would have implemented a DA-like 
reasoning. If he had identified, at a somewhat restrictive level, the reference class with the subspecies 
KRPR VDSLHQV QHDQGHUWDOHQVLV, his anthropic prediction would have then been successful. But the 
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corresponding prediction would have failed if he had chosen, at a slightly more extensive level, the 
species KRPR VDSLHQV as a reference class. And this appears as a confirmatory instance of the 
GLIIHUHQWLDO treatment of the reference class problem and as a disconfirmatory instance of the 
XQGLIIHUHQWLDWHG account. Furthermore, another confirmatory instance can be pointed out at present 
times. For consider, at a greater level of restriction, a reference class consisting of all KRPRVDSLHQV
VDSLHQVKDYLQJQRWNQRZQRIWKHFRPSXWHU. Doesn’t there exist serious grounds for considering that this 
last reference class is promised to a nearest extinction? 
Now this last line of reasoning can be combined with the conclusion of the above developments 
concerning the analogy with the urn. Let us recall the conclusion of the amended DA mentioned 
above: for a given reference class, a bayesian shift SRVVLEO\ ensues. In effect, it has been shown that 
DA only possibly works, for a given class. And this leads to a novel formulation of the argument. For 
if there existed a given reference class for which the argument were conclusive, there could well exist 
a more extensive class for which the argument would fail. This vindicates the differential treatment of 
the reference class problem and finally renders the argument innocuous, by depriving it of its initially 
associated terror. At the same time, this leaves room for the argument to be successful for a given 
reference class, but without its counterintuitive consequences. 
 
To sum up now. What results from the foregoing developments is that the Doomsday Argument 
must be weakened in two ways. First, the analogy underlying the argument must be defined more 
accurately. Once this task accomplished, the bayesian shift associated with the Doomsday Argument 
must now be seen as a SRVVLEOH inference from the premises, and not as an absolutely certain 
consequence. Second, the reference class problem must be taken into account, thus leading to the 
conclusion that the Doomsday Argument could work but without its originally associated terror. This 
has the effect of rendering the conclusion of the argument less counter-intuitive than in its original 
formulation. Given these two sidesteps, it seems that the resulting novel formulation of the argument 
could be more consensual than the original one. 
Lastly, what precedes casts light on an essential facet of the Doomsday Argument. For on a narrow 
sense, it is an argument about the fate of humankind. But on a broad sense (the one I have been 
concerned with) it emphasizes the difficulty of applying probabilistic models to real-life situations23, a 
difficulty which is usually largely underestimated. This opens a path to a whole field of practical 
interest, whose philosophical importance would have been unravelled without John Leslie’s robust and 
courageous defence of the argument24. 
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1
 The solution to DA presented here is a somewhat condensed and enhanced version of the ideas developed in 
Franceschi (2002), that also discusses at length the problems related to DA: *RG
V &RLQ 7RVV, the 6OHHSLQJ
%HDXW\SUREOHP, the 6KRRWLQJ5RRP3DUDGR[, the 3UHVRPSWXRXV3KLORVRSKHU. 
2
 Cf. Korb & Oliver (1998). 
3
 From Bostrom (1997). 
4
 More precisely, Leslie considers an analogy with the ORWWHU\FDVH. 
5
 Cf. (1997, p. 256): ’How is it possible in the selection of a random rank to give the appropriate weight to 
unborn members of the population?’. 
6
 Cf. (2003, p. 9): ’But who or what has the propensity to randomly assign me a temporal location in the duration 
of the human race? There is no such mechanism.’. But Sober is mainly concerned with providing empirical 
evidence against the hypotheses used in the original version of DA. 
7
 Cf. (2002, p. 40): ’My claim is that by assigning a rank to each person based on birth order, a time correlation is 
established (...).’ and also (2002, p. 44): ’The doomsday argument has been shown to be fallacious due to the 
incorrect assumption that you are a random sample from the set of all humans ever to have existed.’. 
8
 Cf. (1997, p. 251). 
9
 Cf. (2002, p. 39). 
10
 It could be pointed out that a small amount of time is necessary to perform the bayesian shift, once the 
problem’s data are known. But this can be avoided if one considers ideal thinkers, who perform bayesian shifts at 
the time when they are informed of the elements of the situation. 
11
 I borrow this terminology from Chambers (2001). 
12
 From now on, for the sake of simplicity, I refer to one single urn (containing either 10 or 1000 balls) instead of 
two, since it is equivalent to the original WZRXUQFDVH. 
13
 Cf. Sowers (2002, p. 40): ’My claim is that by assigning a rank to each person based on birth order, a time 
correlation is established in essentially the same way that the stopwatch process established a correlation with 
the balls.’. 
14
 This can be equivalently rendered with the following computer algorithm: at T1, draw randomly a number 
between 1 and Q; if 1 is issued then display 1 and stop; else at T2, draw randomly a number between 2 and Q; if 2 
is issued then display 2 and stop; ...; else at Ti, draw randomly a number between L and Q; if L is issued then 
display L and stop. 
15
 To give an example. At the beginning, the urn contains 10 balls. The following random sequence is then 
issued: 325-125-88-816-524-9-7. At T6, the coin lands tails and the number of balls in the urn is left unchanged. 
The device stops at T7. 
16
 To give an example. At the beginning, the urn contains 10 balls. The following random sequence is then 
issued: 2-9-6-8-5 and the device stops at T5. At T7, the coin lands heads and 990 balls are added in the urn. 
17
 To be accurate: from the beginning of the chosen UHIHUHQFHFODVV. 
18
 For a treatment of the UHIHUHQFHFODVVSUREOHP, see notably Eckhardt (1993, 1997), Bostrom (1997, 2002, ch. 4 
pp. 69-72 and ch. 5), Franceschi (1998, 1999). 
19
 In the part entitled ’Just who should count as being human?’ (pp. 256-63) 
20
 Cf. 1996, p. 260: ’Widenings of reference class can easily be taken too far.’ and p. 261: ’Again, some ways of 
QDUURZLQJ a reference class might perhaps seem inappropriate.’. 
21
 This is congruent with Elliott Sober’s (2003) attempt at empirically testing the assumptions resulting from DA. 
22
 Cf. Franceschi (1998, p. 243). 
23
 This important underpinning of the argument is also underlined in Delahaye (1996). This is also the main point 
of Sober (2003). 
24
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paper. I especially thank Jean-Paul Delahaye for very useful comments and discussion. I am also indebted to 
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reference class problem. 
